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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
consent before enacting a tax. A counter-argument to this would
be that in seeking such a broad basis of consent the state is dilut-
ing the vote of those who favor a tax because of their political
views. 4 It is submitted that if the equal protection clause is
found to be applicable to the two-thirds tax law, in light of the
noted cases, it is doubtful that the state can prove a compelling
state interest.
Since the application of the equal protection clause to voting
right cases seems now firmly imbedded in our constitutional law,
the states cannot deny the franchise to anyone unless a "compel-
ling state interest" in doing so is demonstrated. For this reason




Plaintiff, the State of Louisiana through its Department of
Highways, initiated this suit to perfect the expropriation of a
certain tract of land, which was encumbered by a lease with sixty
months left in its unexpired term. The trial court awarded sepa-
rate compensation to the lessee in addition to the value of the
property in perfect ownership awarded to the lessor-landowner.
1
Plaintiff appealed on the basis that the lessee's award should be
paid out of, and not in addition to, the amount found by the court
to be the true value of the tract in perfect ownership. Reversing,
the supreme court held that where the value of the taken tract in
perfect ownership is determined by using the actual value of the
lease and the cost of reproduction of the premises less an amount
for depreciation thereof, and these two determinations are sub-
stantially the same, the lessee is to be paid out of and not in ad-
dition to this amount. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 253
La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969).
As a practical matter, the process of expropriation 2 was
relatively unknown in the United States in the earliest stages of
64. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562-63 (1964).
1. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 209 So.2d 780 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1968).
2. As used in this Note, the term "expropriation" means a taking of




its infancy due to the extreme abundance of virgin land within
its then still undefined territory. As the country became more
urbanized and more of the land came to be owned by private
interests, the establishment of highways and other public utili-
ties gave birth to the need for a system whereby the federal
and state governments could justly acquire real estate needed for
these purposes. Two decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in 18963 held that the requirement of just compensation
of the fifth amendment 4 to the United States Constitution is
deemed applicable to the states via the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 5 However, many state constitutions had
for decades contained provisions requiring the payment of just
compensation upon the expropriation of private property. At
the present time, every state of the United States7 except North
Carolina8 has a constitutional provision requiring this procedure.
A very similar provision existed in Louisiana for more than
twenty years before the passage and ratification of the fourteenth
amendment.9 Although split into two articles, substantially the
same provisions are found in the 1879 constitution; 0 and the
present State Constitution contains no less than three provisions
on expropriation and the guarantee of just compensation.1
In order to understand the practical applications of expro-
priation calculations, it is necessary to compare the nature of the
interests in land held by the lessor and lessee under Anglo-
American law and under the law of Louisiana. Under the theory
3. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 165 U.S. 112 (1896); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."
5. Id. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
6. See generaly Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process Before the Cviil
War, 24 RARV. L. REv. 366, 460 (1911).
7. See C. HAAR, LAND-Use PLANNING 470 (1959).
8. In North Carolina, compensation has been held to be required under
the principles of natural law. Staton v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., 111 N.C.
278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892).
9. La. Const. art. CIX (1845): "No ex post facto law, nor any law im-
pairing the obligations of contracts, shall be passed, nor vested rights be
divested, unless for purpose of public utility, and for adequate compensation
previously made." see also La. Civ. Code arts. 2605-2607 (1825).
10. La. Const. art. VI (1879): "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, except by due process of law." Id. art. CLVI: "Private property
shall not be taken nor damaged for public purposes without just and ade-
quate compensation being first paid."
11. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 15; art. VI, § 19.1.
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of estates, 12 upon which the Anglo-American law of real property
is founded, the highest degree of ownership is the estate known
as the fee simple absolute.' 3 Out of this may be carved lesser
estates intended to endure for a shorter span of time than would
be evinced by a conveyance styled, "to A and his heirs and assigns
forever." 14 The lesser estate of particular note at this point is the
estate for years 5 or lease. When an estate for years is conveyed
by the fee simple owner, he becomes the owner of a future in-
terest 16 called a reversion in fee simple17 and the lessee is the
owner of an estate for years.'8 The principal result of the Anglo-
American property system is that both lessor and lessee own
estates in the land subject to the lease. This means that upon the
expropriation of the tract, both have a compensable interest in
the taken land and each must be awarded just compensation ac-
cording to the extent of his respective interest as each interest
constitutes property within the meaning of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.
19
In Louisiana, the practice of giving an award to the lessee,
upon expropriation, for his interest has by some writers been
attributed to a feeling that the state probably felt obliged to
follow the procedure of Anglo-American jurisdictions.2 0 However,
this practice finds considerable support in the civil law. Civil
Code article 2015 provides that a lease creates a real obligation
in favor of the lessee.2 ' Taking the view that a real obligation
is but the correlative partner of a real right, it may be concluded
that the lessee has a real right in the leased premises. 2 But, the
12. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 28
(1962); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.7 (Casner ed. 1952).
13. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 29
(1962); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.8, 2.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
14. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
15. see C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 63
(1962); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.11, 3.13 (Casner ed. 1952).
16. see C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 93
(1962); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
17. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 94
(1962); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.16 (Casner ed. 1952).
18. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 73
(1962); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.13 (1952).
19. See J. SACKMAN, 2 NICHOL'S THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN J 5.23 (rev.
3d ed. 1963).
20. See, e.g., Comment, 24 LA. L. REV. 849, 873 (1964).
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2015: "Not only servitudes, but leases and all other
rights, which the owner had imposed on his land before the alienation of
the soil, form real obligations which accompany it in the hands of the per-
son who acquires it .... "
22. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law:
Part II, 23 LA. L. Rv. 518, 523 (1963).
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contract of predial lease has traditionally been regarded as one
creating only personal rights.28 Also, the lessee is not permitted
to bring either the possessory or the petitory action in order to
protect his interest. 4 However, the supreme court has held that
the lessee is owed compensation for his interest upon expropri-
ation of the premises.25 Thus, the right of the lessee functions as
one of a personal character when he seeks to avail himself of the
protection of the possessory and petitory actions,28 but functions
as a real right when the premises are transferred by conventional
means 27 or expropriation.2 8 This suggests that the contract of
predial lease is actually one of a hybrid nature.2 Because the
lessee's interest functions as a real right in expropriation pro-
ceedings, there is support for classifying it as an incorporeal im-
movable, 0 and this adds considerable weight to the proposition
that compensation to the lessee is proper.81
Having determined the presence and nature of the separate
interests of lessor and lessee in an expropriation proceeding, it
is necessary to discuss briefly methods recognized and utilized
by the courts in computing the expropriation award. There are
three generally recognized appraisal procedures in Louisiana:
(1) market data as to the sales of comparable property in the
vicinity; (2) cost of reproduction less depreciation; and (3) capi-
talization of the economic rent.82 Different combinations of the
three provide the two most prevalent methods used in appraising
the value in perfect ownership of property subject to a lease.
The first method is to add the present value of the land to
the cost of reproducing the improvements, if any, less an amount
equal to the depreciation of these improvements.u The most
widely used procedure for valuing bare land is to compare it,
23. Id. Part I, 23 LA. L. REv. 161, 189 (1963).
24. Id. at 190.
25. In re Morgan R.R. & S.S., 32 La. Ann. 371 (1880).
26. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3651-3664.
27. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2015, 2011. Note that the public records doctrine
must be complied with in order for the real right to be effective against
subsequent acquirers of the tract. See id. arts 2239, 2251-2266, 2452; LA. R.S.
9:2271, 2272; McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
28. See In re Morgan R.R. & S.S., 32 La. Ann. 371 (1880).
29. See Yiannopoulos, Real R ghts in Louisiana and Conparative Law:
Part II, 23 LA. L. REv. 518, 550 (1963).
30. See 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAw OF PIROPERTY § 61 (1966).
31. See LX. Civ. CODS arts. 2626, 2628; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 15;
art. VI, § 19.1.
32. See generally State, Dep't of Highways v. Crockett, 131 So.2d 129 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1961).
33. State, Dep't of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955).
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either on a front foot or a square footage basis, to sales of com-
parable land in the vicinity.84 The value of the improvements
is determined by finding their replacement cost less whatever
depreciation may be attributed to them due to age, dilapidation,
or obsolescence, or a combination of any or all of these.85 By
adding the value of the land to the adjusted value of the improve-
ments, a sum is obtained which represents the present value of
the tract in perfect ownership. Since this is a total valuation of
perfect ownership, it should follow that all interests are to be
compensated out of this amount because, logically, the sum of
the parts should not exceed the value of the whole.86
The second method also arrives at the total value by adding
the present value of the land to the value of the improvements,
but utilizes a procedure for computing the latter in which age
and cost are irrelevant. 7 The value of the improvements is found
to be the capitalized amount of the rent attributable to the
improvements s over the remainder of the lease term. Thus, the
earnings attributable to the improvements are used to find their
present value. This is known as the building residual method of
deriving improvement value,89 and when combined with the
value of the land, produces a figure equal to the present valua-
tion of the entirety.0
With respect to the apportioning of awards, attention is now
directed at one method for determining the lessor's interest. This
is computed by adding the present value of the land to the capi-
talized value of the rent reserved in the lease (contract rent)
over the remaining period of the lease.4' By using the rent
reserved in the lease as a base, the final sum necessarily excludes
any interest of the lessee. This is because his interest if any, in
the taken tract will only be the value of his lease advantage,
34. S. MCMICHAEL, APPRAISING MANUAL 31 (4th ed. 1966).
35. Id. at 460.
36. See generally 27 AM. JUR. 2d EMINENT DOMAIN § 247 (1966).
37. See G. SCHMUTZ, THE APPRAISAL PROCESS § 1801 (1953).
38. Id. at § 3506. This is known as the economic rent and is that which
would be received if a lease were negotiated on the date of appraisal which
would put the premises to their best use. It is an expected rent and should
not be confused with the rent reserved in the lease which is known as the
contract rent.
39. See G. SCHMUTZ, TH APPRAISAL PROCESS §§ 1801-1816 (1953); S.
MCMICHAEL, APPRAISING MANUAL 43 (4th ed. 1966).
40. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969).
41. State, Dep't of Highways v. Cockerham, 182 So.2d 786 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1966), cart. denied, 249 La. 110, 185 So.2d 219 (1966).
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unless of course, he has paid the full rent in advance.42 This
lease advantage is found to be the difference, if any, between the
rent reserved in the lease and the higher economic rent attribu-
table to the premises. "Whenever the contract rent is below eco-
nomic rent, a leasehold interest (lease advantage) in favor of
the tenant exists. Whether the landowner-lessor wishes or not,
he is now sharing the value of his property with his tenant."4 8
With the foregoing in mind, now will be examined the activity
of Louisiana courts in this area.
In 1880, the Supreme Court of Louisiana handed down its
historic decision In re Morgan R.R. & S.S.44 In this opinion the
court recognized that the lessee of land subject to expropriation
is entitled to compensation for his right in the taken land, if such
right gives him a lease advantage. But the court went on to
hold that the lessee's award could not be taken out of the award
to the landowner-lessor unless the rent had been paid in advance
or, "the value of his right has been fixed by the present actual
value of the lease.
'45
In 1955, the court decided State, Dep't of Highways v. Ferris4"
in which it awarded the lease advantage to the lessee in addition
to an award to the landowner-lessor based upon the value of the
land plus the value of the improvements (by cost less depreci-
ation), or a valuation of the tract in perfect ownership.4 7 The
court reasoned from Morgan that the only time the lessee gets
paid out of the value in full ownership is when the rent is paid
in advance or the lessor's rights are fixed by using the present
actual value of the lease. It is submitted that this award was a
misapplication of the rule of the Morgan case since the court in
Morgan never intended for a lessee to be awarded an amount
above and beyond the present value of the tract in perfect own-
ership nor does the language of that case point to that conclu-
sion.48
The question of leasehold interest in an expropriation pro-
42. In re Morgan R.R. & S.S., 32 La. Ann. 371 (1880).
43. G. JAcoSsoN, PROOF OF VALUE IN EMINENT DOMAIN LEASEHOLD INTERESTS
41 (Highway Research Record No. 260, 1969).
44. 32 La. Ann. 371 (1880).
45. Id. Note that this is entirely correct as the "present actual value
of the lease" means the economic rent attributable to the premises and by
using such as a base, the result is a valuation of the entirety. See text ac-
companying note 38 supra.
46. 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955).
47. See text accompanying note 36 supra,
48. Bee note 45 supra.
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ceeding surfaced again in 1965 with the holding of the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal in State, Dep't of Highways v. Cockerham.49
The court found the valuation of the entirety to be the sum of
the lessor's interest plus the lessee's interest or lease advantage,
both discounted to present value. The lessor's interest was com-
puted by capitalization of income (based on the rent reserved
in the lease)5o while the lease advantage was found to be the
difference between the contract and economic rentals. This would
seem to run afoul of the rule of Morgan, but it must be remem-
bered that although the lessor's right was fixed by the value of
the lease, it was by the value as to him alone, that is, on the
basis of the contract rent. Thus, the additional award to the
lessee was quite proper if not required. It is interesting to note
that the awards in Cockerham were discounted to present value,
a very commendable solution.
In Holmes,51 the improvements were valued by two proce-
dures, cost less depreciation and capitalization of income. The
trial court and the court of appeal concluded that under the ruling
of the supreme court in the Ferris case and that of the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal in the Cockerham case, the lessee's award
(lease advantage) should be paid in addition to the amount paid
to the lessor for the value of the property in perfect ownership.52
Reference has already been made to the oversight within the
Ferris opinion5" and the facts of the instant case do not fall within
the purview of the Cockerham decision due to the fact that in
Cockerham the valuation of the entirety was not fixed by capitali-
zation of the economic rental.54 In Holmes, the valuation of the
entirety was based on a capitalization of the economic rent attrib-
utable to the premises, which necessarily includes the lease
advantage. 55
49. 182 So.2d 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 249 IL 110, 185
So.2d 219 (1966).
50. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
51. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969).
52. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 209 So.2d 780 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1968).
53. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55. It is interesting to note that the court of appeal in the Holmes case
used a higher value ($550) for the economic rental when fixing the value of the
entirety than it used when fixing the lease advantage ($400). Thus the court
subtracted the contract rent ($200) from $400 and arrived at $200 when they
should have subtracted from $550 and arrived at a lease advantage of $350
per month. The court points this out but finds it to be non-germane as the
lessee did not appeal the decision of the court of appeal. 253 La. 1099, 1106,
221 So.2d 811, 814 (1969).
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The court in Holmes justified its reversal by bringing the
case within the rule of Morgan and without overruling its prior
decision in the Ferris case. It reasoned that the award of the
lessor had been fixed with reference to the present actual value
of the lease and therefore the lease advantage should properly
be deducted therefrom. It is submitted that this decision is not
as much a mixture of fact and law as the court made it seem to
be by bringing it under the Morgan rule.
The writer suggests the rule should be that the sum of the
parts cannot exceed the whole; and therefore, where a valuation
is made of the property in perfect ownership, by whatever means,
the lessee must receive his award out of that amount. It could be
argued that this would prevent the landowner-lessor from receiv-
ing the total fair market value for his land. But in an expropria-
tion proceeding, it is submitted that a lessor is not entitled to
the entire amount of the fair market value because of the out-
standing real right held by the lessee,56 which subtracts from
both the quantitative and qualitative nature of the lessor's inter-
est in the land. Thus, the sum of these two interests, where the
rights to the land are not further subdivided, equals the value of
the land in full or perfect ownership and can equal no more.5
This is the conclusion reached by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal in basing its decision in State, Dep't of Highways v.
Thorntons on the Holmes case even though the entirety was
valued by using the cost less reproduction approach. That court
said that under the rule of Holmes, the lease advantage must
always be paid out of the value of the tract in perfect ownership69
The sound and just accounting technique of discounting
awards to their present value has been used in the jurispru-
dence, but has not as yet become a requirement in the adjudi-
56. See text accompanying notes 20-31 supra. See also LA. CIv. CODE arts.
488-492.
57. State, Dep't of Highways v. Thornton, 220 So.2d 217, 223 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969).
58. 220 So.2d 217 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
59. The supreme court has also stated that this is the rule which should
follow from its decision in the Holmes case, but it has said so without over-
ruling the Ferris opinion. See State, Dep't of Highways v. D & J Realty Co.,
No. 49,402 (La. Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1969).
60. See State, Dep't of Highways v. D & 3 Realty Co., No. 49,402 (La.
Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1969); State, Dep't of Highways v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136
So.2d 35 (1961); State, Dep't of Highways v. Cockerham, 182 So.2d 786 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 249 La. 110, 185 So.2d 219 (1966).
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cation of expropriation sums. 1' As the whole theory of just com-
pensation in expropriation is geared to the value at the time of
the taking, it seems rather anomalous to require the expropriator
to pay these sums without their first being discounted to present
value. It is submitted that the supreme court should expressly
recognize this principle as being one required by law in the fix-
ing of such adjudications.
Winston E. Rice
PRESCRIPTION OF A MODE OF USE OF A SERVITUDE
In 1949, plaintiff Hanks' ancestor in title conveyed to the
defendant, Gulf States Utilities, the servitude which is described
in part as follows: "... . the right, privilege and servitude to enter
upon and erect, construct, extend,... replace, remove, repair and
patrol one line of poles, frames or towers which may be erected
simultaneously or at some future time... [for] use as adapted for
the transmission of electricity, electrical energy and power."' The
defendant immediately erected a single line of poles supporting
one electrical wire. Thirteen years later, defendant replaced the
single line of poles with a double line known as H-frames. Plain-
tiff Hanks instituted an action for damages resulting from the
alleged trespass. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court's
decision that the replacement of the single line with the H-
frames constituted a trespass. The appellate court reasoned that
three modes of use, poles, frames and towers, of the servitude
had been granted and the right to construct H-frames had pre-
scribed by non-usage for ten years according to article 796 of the
Civil Code.2 The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding
that the above-mentioned rights were accessory rights and as
such had not prescribed. Hanks v. Gulf States Util. Co., 253 La.
946, 221 So.2d 249 (1969).
The original existence of the right of Gulf States to replace
61. See State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811
(1969); State, Dep't of Highways v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955);
State, Dep't of Highways v. Thornton, 220 So.2d 217 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
1. Hanks v. Gulf States Util. Co., 253 La. 946, 947, 221 So.2d 249, 250 (1969).
2. LA. CiV. CODS art. 796: "The mode of servitude is subject to prescription
as well as the servitude itself, and in the same manner.
"By mode of servitude, in this case, is understood the manner of using
the servitude as is prescribed in the title."
[Vol. 30
